Toward a New Doha?

Many Lebanese turned their eyes to a five-party meeting in Paris last week, wondering what would come of it. The meeting brought together representatives from France, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt, with the aim of reaching agreement on a road map for the Lebanese parties to exit from their seemingly endless political and economic crises.

When the participants issued no final statement, however, pessimism prevailed. But that attitude was not necessarily justifiable. The reality is that what is going on behind the scenes appears to be a series of negotiations over who will succeed Michel Aoun as president, which has opened up a wider discussion encompassing who will become prime minister and the financial package that may be involved to ease Lebanon’s monumental economic woes.

In other words, Lebanon is heading toward a possible resolution of its political stalemate through a regional and local package deal—not unlike the Doha Agreement of May 2008, which prevented a civil war in Lebanon and subsequently led to the election of Michel Suleiman as president and the formation of a national-unity government. A new agreement appears to be in the works, and while its provisions, or even success, remain uncertain, all the talk is of a political solution tied to conflicts in the region, with an economic dimension added on to it.

The Paris meeting, therefore, represented an occasion for the five participants to prepare their wish list for Lebanon. A possible reason why no communiqué was issued is that France preferred to leave the door open for further consultations with other states, notably Iran. The Qataris are in an excellent position to play mediator between Tehran and Saudi Arabia, while also having very friendly relations with the Americans and the French. The Qataris are, similarly, well connected on the local Lebanese scene and have longstanding contacts with Hezbollah.

The ingredients of a wider package deal are many, beyond the profile of who becomes president or prime minister. To the Saudis, the priority will be to see what Iran concedes in the Yemeni conflict in exchange for the Saudis helping Lebanon, which is seen as being under Iranian influence. Though the truce in Yemen was not renewed last October, Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, have resumed backchannel talks to prolong it and negotiate a broader solution. This is bound to improve the atmosphere in talks over Lebanon.

Hezbollah also appears to be seeking a more consensual way out of the Lebanese predicament. The party does not control a majority in parliament, and for there to be any agreement over a president it would have to compromise with its rivals, and even some allies. Hezbollah’s favorite is Suleiman Franjieh, who for now has the misfortune of being opposed by two major Christian parties, the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement, denying him communal legitimacy.

Hezbollah realizes that flexibility is inevitable. In an intriguing article written on November 2 of last year, the editor of the Al-Akhbar newspaper, Ibrahim Amin, who is often used by the party as a mouthpiece, explained that because no side in the Lebanese divide could impose a candidate of its own, it was time to think of finding a middle ground. This compromise would be along the lines of “the choice of the president is ours, and the choice of the prime minister is yours.” Amin clarified the thought when he noted that the pro-Hezbollah bloc could bring in Suleiman Franjieh as president and Saudi Arabia’s allies could bring in Nawaf Salam, a former Lebanese ambassador to the United Nations, as prime minister.

Not surprisingly, the Saudis failed to react to this. However, they could not have failed to understand its implications. Hezbollah was sending an implicit message that it was seeking an arrangement with Riyadh, when previously it had tried to block the Saudis out in Lebanon. This spoke to the party’s keenness to avoid the repercussions of an open-ended impasse, one that it could not resolve through its usual tools of intimidation or obstructionism.

Unconfirmed reports suggest the Saudis are looking closely at who would become prime minister, amid signs that they regard the current prime minister, Najib Miqati, as being too close to Hezbollah. The French, in turn, are said to favor Miqati, feeling that he is the person best able to support French interests in Lebanon—not least expanding the participation of French companies in Lebanon’s ailing economic sectors. TotalEnergies is already a major player in Lebanon’s Qana offshore gas field, while the CMA CGM Group was awarded management and development of the Beirut Port’s container terminal.

Questions such as who is chosen for which position take time to address. If a package deal is agreed from the multiple levels of negotiations, everyone will have to be satisfied. Hezbollah is unlikely to accept a president who is too close to the Saudis, Americans, French, and Egyptians, but is also caught in a dilemma: the party cannot impose Franjieh on parliament, and even less so on a Christian community that is more than ever unwilling to see its leading representatives in the state chosen by the Muslim majority. This obliges Hezbollah to search for alternative candidates who may not be ideal for the party, but whom it may have to accept in order to reach a comprehensive accord.

That is why it seems premature to discuss specific names of presidential candidates. Whoever emerges as a front-runner will do so from the froth of regional and local bargaining. Franjieh cannot be elected today, nor can the army commander Joseph Aoun. However, if a broad agreement is reached among the five countries involved in the Paris meeting and Iran and Hezbollah, pushing other Lebanese actors to fall into line, then all candidates still have a chance, depending on who best fits the final conditions of the agreement.

Walid Joumblatt is usually a careful reader of the regional tea leaves, which perhaps explains his recent efforts to advance a presidential initiative of his own. By doing so, the Druze leader was probably trying to strengthen his hand locally as contacts are ongoing at the regional level to find a candidate who satisfies all the parties.

We should dispense with the illusion that the Lebanese, on their own, will reach an agreement over a new president and prime minister. Nor do the Lebanese parties have any incentive to facilitate such an outcome, as they are keen to see what financial inducements are thrown into any accord, which can only come from the Gulf participants. If the Qataris are willing to pay an advance on their profits from participation in the Qana field, as some observers have suggested lately, then embracing a political package deal can also be economically lucrative. Something is coming together on Lebanon, even if for now the exchanges are continuing.